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ratings. The LDP and its coalition partner, the Komei 
Party, won 313 out of 465 seats in the Lower House, 
holding on to the two-thirds majority the coalition 
had secured back in December 2014. The LDP alone 
won 284 seats, down from the 291 seats it held be-
fore. The party that wanted to challenge Abe’s ruling 
coalition, the Kibo no To (Party of Hope) recently
founded by former LDP defense minister and now 
Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike, won only 50 seats. The 
even more recently founded Constitutional Demo-
cratic Party (CDP) won 55 seats. Abe, however, might 
not sit as ﬁ rmly in the saddle as the election results 
suggest. Earlier this year, he was accused of using his 
inﬂ uence to help a like-minded nationalist friend se-
cure approval to open a private university. He is also 
accused of having donated money to an ultra-natio-
Introduction
In general elections held on October 22, Japan’s gov-
ernment led by the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) 
under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was able to de-
fend its two-third majority in the Lower House. The 
elections proved another landslide victory for the 
governing coalition, and the prime minister’s consti-
tutionally controversial decision to call snap elec-
tions paid off  after a recent recovery in his approval 
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nalist school in Osaka that was built on government 
land sold to a close friend at a large discount.
For its part, the European Union (EU) is clearly in 
need of a foreign policy success story. Currently
burdened by the UK’s chaotic departure, a wave of 
populism, inwardness, xenophobia and European 
political parties seeking to challenge existing stan-
dards and norms, Brussels needs evidence that it is 
still to be counted on as peaceful promoter of global 
liberal values.
This is where an EU-Japan agreement could poten-
tially make a diff erence. The two partners are aiming 
high as regards cooperation in international politics 
and security. The instrument through which such 
increased and institutionalized cooperation is en-
visioned is the so-called EU-Japan Strategic Part-
nership Agreement (SPA), which has been agreed 
“in principle” and which both sides hope to ﬁ nalize 
by the end of the year. The parties to the agreement 
have a not unimpressive track record of adopting 
joint policies on a regional and global scale (e.g. joint 
conﬂ ict mediation and peace-building initiatives 
in Africa and Asia; for details see Table 1). Howev-
er, there is a near-consensus among analysts that 
EU-Japan non-military security cooperation has yet 
to reach its full potential. The SPA thus aims to re-
duce the gap between the EU-Japan security alliance 
as announced in joint statements and the one actu-
ally taking place on the ground.
Now or never – maybe
The SPA is not necessarily a precondition for Brussels 
and Tokyo to cooperate in on-the-ground regional 
and global security, as their previous non-military 
activities show. Yet the adoption of the SPA would 
send a message that Europe and Japan are willing to 
uphold the universally established norms and values 
that are increasingly being challenged around the 
globe. In other words, if ever there was a time for the 
EU and Japan to step up to the table of international 
relations, it is now. The SPA, moreover, could be the 
vehicle for doing just that.
The EU, like Japan, has not made any details of the 
SPA available, beyond generally outlining the areas it 
will cover. Indeed, the information to be had on Eu-
ropean External Action Service (EEAS) websites about 
the contents of the agreement is very scarce indeed. 
While the EU Commission’s Directorate-General for 
Trade (DG Trade) decided to make the draft agree-
ment publicly available in mid-2017, the EEAS did not 
follow suit. The decision not to render information 
public somehow gives the impression that EU poli-
cymakers think they are operating in an area where 
transparency and accountability are optional as op-
posed to compulsory. Or, possibly, the EU Commis-
sion, which is in charge of the EU-Japan Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA)/Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA), took the step to counter accusations of 
non-transparency while the EEAS did not.
Against the background of the crisis of the liberal 
world order, the adoption of the SPA in 2017 would 
indeed be very welcome as it would signal that
Brussels and Tokyo are joining forces to uphold and 
strengthen established standards of international 
politics and security. While the US under President 
Donald Trump has turned to isolationist foreign 
and trade policies, China is – in deﬁ ance of liberal
norms and international law – promoting its own 
models of economic and political governance on
regional and global levels.
Four years of negotiations
The second half of 2017 saw an acceleration of SPA 
negotiations and it is probably accurate to conclude 
that the unpredictable US presidency of Donald Trump 
prompted both sides to ﬁ nally agree – after miss-
ing several self-imposed deadlines – to adopt the 
agreement by the end of 2017. Indeed, Abe’s EU policy 
advisors must have counseled him not only to invest 
in the alliance with the US, despite Trump’s erratic 
behavior, but also to contribute to regional and global 
stability by cooperating in turbulent times with a fel-
low soft power, the EU.
The plan to upgrade cooperation between the EU 
and Japan – whom Brussels refers to as “natural
allies” – was launched in 2010. During the 20th 
EU-Japan Summit held that year, the EU and Japan 
agreed to adopt two legally-binding agreements: 
one to institutionalize and expand bilateral coop-
eration in international politics and security, and a 
second to increase bilateral trade and investment ties 
through free trade. This led to the so-called Frame-
work Agreement (FA), which was later divided into 
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the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) and the 
EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)/
Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Brussels and Tokyo 
decided that the two agreements would be adopted 
together and simultaneously. The European Com-
mission was obliged to seek authorization from the 
Union’s member states to negotiate the agreements 
based on the outcome of so-called “scoping exer-
cises.” The actual negotiations for the SPA began in 
2013, and after the 11th round the EU and Japan were 
able to agree on 31 out of 54 articles in March 2016. 
The outstanding articles – referred to by the EU at 
the time as “politically sensitive” – were agreed 
upon in July 2017, a success announced at the 24th 
EU-Japan Summit held the same month. Yet nego-
tiations for the SPA continue, since the agreements 
require what Brussels refers to as “ﬁ nal legal ﬁ ne 
tuning.”
Table 1:  EU-Japan Relations – Chronology and Key Initiatives
The SPA is envisioned to be “binding” in the sense 
that there will be a well-deﬁ ned list of issues and 
areas the EU and Japan will address in the years 
ahead. However, the extent to which Brussels and 
Tokyo believe the SPA actually obliges them to
implement the kind of cooperation formulated in
the agreement is unclear, at least to the outside 
observer. The SPA’s 54 articles cover cooperation 
in over 30 areas and will upgrade EU-Japan politi-
cal and security cooperation, moving from sectoral 
agreements to one comprehensive binding agree-
ment. The economic and trade benefits resulting 
from the EPA/FTA are also impressive. For exam-
ple, the free trade agreement is expected to boost 
EU exports to Japan by 34 percent and Japanese 
exports to the EU by 29 percent in coming years 
and will save Japan and the EU €1 billion in custom 
duties per year. 
1959 Accreditation of Japan's ﬁ rst representative to the European Communities (EC)
1974 Establishment of the delegation of the European Communities in Japan
1987 Japanese MITI and the European Commission establish the EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation
1991 First EU-Japan bilateral summit in The Hague; adoption of The Hague Declaration
1994 Creation of EU Gateway to Japan program to enhance trade and investment between Europe and Japan
2001 EU and Japan adopt the EU-Japan action plan Shaping our Common Future (expired in 2011)
2002 EU-Japan Mutual Recognition Agreement
2003 2005, 2007 Cooperation on the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)  
2003 EU-Japan Agreement on Cooperation on Anticompetitive Activities
2003 Biannual meetings of the EU-Japan Troika Working Group on Human Rights
2004 Co-chairs of the Ministerial Conference on Peace Consolidation and Economic Development of the West Balkans (Tokyo)
2004 
Joint adoption of a protocol on disarmament and non-proliferation promoting the acceleration of the UN action plan on 
small arms and light weapons
2005 Launch of EU-Japan Strategic Dialogue on East Asian Security
2005 EU-Japan Year of People-to-People Exchanges
2006 EU-Japan Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
2008 EU-Japan Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance
2008 EU-Japan Meeting on Human Security in the Western Balkans
2009 EU-Japan Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation
2009 EU-Japan Agreement on Mutual Legal assistance in Criminal Matters
2009 and 2010 EU-Japan joint capacity-building seminars held in Tajikistan
2010 Creation of high-level group to identify options for the comprehensive strengthening EU-Japan trade and political relations
2011 Start of EU-Japan cooperation in disaster prevention
2012 EU-Japan “scoping exercises” for EU-Japan EPA/FTA and SPA concluded
2013 Launch of negotiations for SPA and FTA
July 2017 EU-Japan agree to adopt FTA and SPA by end of 2017
Source: Author
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What kind of agreement?
It is yet not known whether the SPA will be an 
EU-only or a mixed agreement. The European Com-
mission is obviously aiming for an EU-only agree-
ment, which would give the Commission exclusive 
competence, while a number of EU member states 
want a mixed agreement, which would have to be 
ratiﬁ ed by all EU member states. If the latter type is 
chosen, the inner-European adoption process could 
be slowed down signiﬁ cantly in 2018 and beyond.
The SPA is not entirely free of controversy. Tokyo, 
for example, was opposed to the introduction of the 
EU’s so-called “essential elements clause,” which 
the Union uses in agreements with other countries to 
stipulate respect for human rights. The clause requires 
the EU to conduct what is referred to as “princi-
pled foreign policy” as formulated in Article 21 of 
the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). The EU is obliged to include the clause even in 
agreements with like-minded democratic countries, 
something the European Commission and the EEAS 
2012
Goods Services
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2013 2013
2014 2014
2015 2015
2016 2016
Figure 2: EU Trade with Japan in Goods and Services
Source: European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade; http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_111836.pdf
€ 65.00 
€ 56.60 
€ 56.60 
€ 59.90 
 € 66.60 
Im
po
rt
s
B
ill
io
n 
€
€ 15.50 
€ 14.80 
€ 15.00 
€ 15.80 
 € 16.30 
Im
po
rt
s
B
ill
io
n 
€
 € 55.70
€ 54.00 
 € 53.30 
€ 53.50 
€ 58.00 
Ex
po
rt
s
B
ill
io
n 
€
 € 24.70
€ 24.30 
 € 26.10 
€ 28.00 
€ 29.40 
Ex
po
rt
s
B
ill
io
n 
€
5 
Asia PolicyBrief | December 2017
have long complained about. In this case, the likeliness 
of Japan violating human rights, thus leading to the 
interruption of negotiations with Brussels, was always 
non-existent. From a Japanese perspective, the clause 
understandably conveys the message that Brussels is 
“supervising” the quality of Japanese foreign policy.
Also (some) hard security?
While non-military security cooperation will remain 
the core of EU-Japan collaboration as formulated in 
the SPA, hard/military cooperation is also envisioned 
as a contribution to regional and global security, not 
least as military cooperation for security purposes 
has already taken place in the recent past. For exam-
ple, Tokyo and Brussels have been working together 
to ﬁ ght maritime piracy off  the coast of Somalia and 
in the Gulf of Aden since 2009. Japanese Maritime 
Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyers began their 
participation in March 2009, and two P-3C maritime 
patrol aircraft were added three months later. The 
MSDF unit has been sharing information with other 
countries. It has also been conducting operations in 
the ﬁ eld, including as part of Operation Atalanta, a 
campaign initiated by the EU Naval Force to com-
bat Somali-based piracy. Working together, Europe-
an and Japanese naval forces arrested a number of 
pirates in 2014, and their joint naval exercises have 
included activities such as tactical maneuvering, 
helicopter take-off s and landings, and boarding.
Under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan is arguably 
more interested in expanding Japanese military ca-
pabilities and security ties with the US than in “soft 
power” security cooperation with the EU. Moreover, 
the country must have its doubts about the EU’s 
ability to help defend Japanese security interests in 
East Asia. While Tokyo has intensiﬁ ed bilateral de-
fense relations with countries such as the UK and 
France in recent years, the EU is undoubtedly of sec-
ondary importance to Tokyo as a policy actor able to 
inﬂ uence hard security issues in Asia. That is, unless 
Brussels is prepared to follow-up on verbal opposi-
tion to Beijing building civilian and military facilities 
on islands in the South China Sea, islands also claimed 
by other countries, with concrete action, such as Eu-
ropean naval patrols in the area, as suggested then by 
French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian in 2016. 
And while there would be nothing wrong – legally or 
operationally – with Europe coordinating patrols in 
the South China Sea with Japan and/or the US, it is 
unlikely that European navies will be active in those 
waters any time soon. For now, Tokyo and Brussels
are limiting themselves to expressing (albeit in an 
increasingly outspoken manner) concerns about 
Chinese territorial expansionism in the area. 
Envisioned as a way of strengthening links in the de-
velopment-security nexus, the SPA is also meant to 
create synergies between the EU’s “comprehensive 
approach” to regional and global security and Japan’s 
“human security” concept in the Middle East and 
Asia. It is also expected to cover what Brussels refers 
to as “post-industrial security dossiers,” i.e. count-
er-terrorism, maritime security, natural disaster pre-
vention, cyber-defense, arms control and non-prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction.
Japanese contributions to CSDP missions
Japanese contributions to EU Common Security and 
Defense Policy (CSDP) missions date back to the 
1990s and the Balkan Wars. Since then, Japan has 
contributed more than $2 billion to the reconstruc-
tion of the Western Balkans as part of what Tokyo 
referred to as “peace-building policies.” This in-
cluded the deployment of an elections observation 
mission to Kosovo (2004), the provision of Over-
seas Development Assistance (ODA) payments to 
the Trust Fund for Human Security on the Balkans 
and the deployment of peacekeepers to Kosovo and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In terms of recent contribu-
tions, Tokyo decided in 2014 to provide grant aid 
through the UN Development Program to the EU’s 
CSDP mission in Niger, spending roughly €1.5 mil-
lion for wireless communication devices and wire-
less-equipped vehicles that can carry out patrols in 
the African country. In March 2015, Japan started 
contributing to the civilian EU CSDP mission in Mali, 
begun in April 2014, assisting Mali’s security sector, 
with Tokyo providing roughly €3.7 million to reha-
bilitate the country’s national police academy.
Brussels and Tokyo are also collaborating on other
defense and security-related activities in Niger, 
Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo that are 
designed to combat terrorism, assist peacekeeping 
eff orts and promote judicial cooperation. Current-
ly, Brussels and Tokyo are negotiating a Framework 
Partnership Agreement (FPA), designed to facilitate 
deployment of Japanese armed forces to CSDP mis-
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sions. Once adopted, the FPA will institutional-
ize Japanese contributions to European CSDP mis-
sions such as those in Niger and Mali. Until the FPA 
is signed, the EU and Japan will, legally speaking, not 
be conducting joint missions, but what Brussels re-
fers to as “parallel coordinated actions.”
Doing business with the UK and France 
In January 2014, France and Japan held their ﬁ rst 
“2 plus 2” meeting, bringing together their foreign 
aff airs and defense ministers. During their second 2 
plus 2 gathering in 2015, the ministers discussed the 
so-called Plan of Action for Africa, which included 
the possibility of joint French-Japanese border secu-
rity actions in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, as well 
as other joint peacekeeping policies and missions in 
Africa. In July 2014, the two countries signed a mem-
orandum of understanding to intensify their cooper-
ation in the area of defense, including the joint de-
velopment of unmanned underwater vehicles.
In April 2012, Tokyo and London signed their ﬁ rst joint 
weapons development agreement. It was followed by 
two more agreements in July 2013: the Defence Equip-
ment Cooperation Framework, designed to facilitate 
joint development of military equipment, and the In-
formation Security Agreement, which promotes coop-
eration in the area of intelligence. This has resulted in 
joint development of chemical and biological-warfare 
suits and cooperation in the area of missile technology, 
among others. In May 2014, the UK and Japan started 
negotiating a bilateral Acquisition and Cross-Servicing 
Agreement, which foresees the provision of logistical 
and technical support to the countries’ armed forces. 
They then held their ﬁ rst 2 plus 2 meeting in January 
2015. The closer cooperation, however, is about mon-
ey as much as security. The expansion of defense ties 
with the UK and France is helping Tokyo give what Ja-
pan’s defense industry has been wanting for decades: a 
slice of the global weapons procurement market, made 
possible by Tokyo lifting its ban in 2014 on exporting 
weapons and weapons technology.
The (Chinese) elephant in the room
If the EU is serious about increasing its involve-
ment in Asian security and if Japan is really Brussels’ 
“natural ally” in Asia, then EU-Japan security coop-
eration must address China’s increasingly assertive 
policies in disputed East and Southeast Asian waters. 
The EU is trying to inﬂ uence Chinese security and 
defense policy behavior through a bilateral EU-
Chinese dialogue on East Asian security, albeit to 
no avail. In 2010, the EU and China established the 
annual EU-China High-level Strategic Dialogue, 
which policymakers in Brussels (falsely) hoped 
would encourage Beijing to become more transparent 
about its territorial policies, defense expenditures 
and military procurement policies. However, Bei-
jing has repeatedly and very assertively made it clear 
that it is not interested in any kind of “interference” 
by the EU in Chinese security and defense policies. 
While Tokyo offi  cially endorses the EU’s (ineff ective) 
attempts to subdue Beijing’s territorial ambitions, 
it is fully aware that Chinese economic "retaliation" 
tactics will severely limit the willingness exhibited 
by Brussels and EU Member States to team up with 
Japan against China and its aggressive territorial 
policies in the East and South China Seas. In the past 
Japan expected – but did not really receive – strong 
EU support for its condemning Chinese intrusions into 
territorial waters claimed by Japan in the East China 
Sea, including those near the Senkaku Islands, which 
Japan has controlled de facto since its victory over 
China in the ﬁ rst Sino-Japanese War in 1894/1895.
Conclusion
If we are to believe what Brussels and Tokyo prom-
ised in July, the SPA will be ﬁ nalized by the end of 
2017. Although the agreement will, above all, insti-
tutionalize the non-military security cooperation 
being carried out by the EU and Japan, the two part-
ners are nonetheless advised to consider increas-
ing tangible, shared contributions to Asian security, 
including joint patrols in the South China Sea. Yet 
even without headline-making cooperative mili-
tary eff orts, the SPA has the potential – even if it is 
probably limited – to help uphold and enforce inter-
national rules and norms, currently challenged by the 
crisis weakening the liberal world order. For that to 
happen, however, the EU and Japan will have to stop 
talking and start spending, thereby realizing the SPA’s 
beneﬁ ts for regional and global peace and stability.
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